Many environmental problems are common pool resource dilemmas. For example, what air pollution, overfishing, and water shortages all have in common is a resource pool that is exploited by individuals at the expense of the entire group that shares the pool. Each individual's choice to drive a car, overfish, or waste water is beneficial to the individual, yet if all individuals in the group made that choice, the group would be worse off than if all individuals had chosen to ride bikes, sustainably fish, or conserve water. This individual versus group benefit structure fits the definition of a social dilemma (Dawes, 1980) . Many resource dilemmas also have another component in common-a temporal dilemma. The choice to drive, overfish, or waste water has immediate benefits but delayed negative consequences; however, the choice to bike, fish sustainably, or conserve water has immediate negative impacts on the individual but delayed benefits for the resource and those using it.
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Thus, confounded within resource dilemmas, the individual faces both social and temporal dilemmas. Individuals who choose to overconsume may do so to maximize personal gain as opposed to social welfare or because they prefer the immediate gain (and delayed loss) as opposed to the delayed gain (and immediate loss). In their review, Hendrickx, Poortinga, and van der Kooij (2001) pointed out that the overwhelming majority of research in this area has focused on the social dilemma, whereas little attention has been paid to the importance of the temporal dilemma. They proposed a model of decision making in resource dilemmas that incorporates the temporal components and suggested several areas of future study that could link the otherwise disconnected research in time discounting and social dilemmas. The purpose of the present study was to investigate the impact that the temporal dilemma has on the choices individuals make in resource dilemmas; specifically, we examined whether diminishing the temporal dilemma would increase cooperation. In addition, we were interested in exploring two individual difference factors, environmental attitudes and concern for the future, that could possibly account for differences in both time discounting and cooperation in resource dilemmas.
Time and Uncertainty in Resource Dilemmas
Much research on resource dilemmas has examined social factors (e.g., group communication, group size, order of consuming, etc.) that affect the likelihood that individuals will cooperate (that is, to sustainably consume a resource) as opposed to defect (overconsume) (e.g., Budescu, Suleiman, & Rapoport, 1995; Dawes, 1980; Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992) . Although it has long been recognized that resource dilemmas normally carry a temporal dilemma (Dawes, 1980) , only a handful of studies have looked at the temporal factors that could affect cooperation (for a review, see Hendrickx et al., 2001) . Platt (1973) labeled these temporal dilemmas as social traps in which short-term consequences are positive but long-term consequences are negative. Platt made the distinction between traps involving one person and those involving a group of individuals; however, social traps in research commonly have been studied with groups and have focused on the social aspects of the dilemma. One exception is Messick and McClelland's (1983) experiment on social traps, in which they tested both individuals and groups using a common pool resource dilemma simulation. In the individual condition, participants were only faced with the temporal dilemma, and in the group condition, they were faced with a confounded temporal and social dilemma. Although participants overconsumed the pool at much higher levels (especially initially) in the group condition, even in the individual condition most participants did not consume sustainably. This suggests that the temporal dilemma alone can lead to overconsumption and resource depletion. Mannix (1990) manipulated the temporal dilemma while holding the social dilemma constant in an experiment in which groups had a pool of simulated funds to allocate to different individuals throughout 15 rounds of play. With each round the value of the money allocated was worth a decreasing amount, simulating inflation at different rates (12% in the high time discounting condition and 2% in the low condition). Therefore, in the high-discounting condition, compared to the low condition, the temporal dilemma was enhanced because money was worth a lot more in earlier rounds than in later rounds. Mannix found that more participants defected in the high time discounting condition than in the low condition.
This extant research indicates that the temporal component of resource dilemmas can be an important factor influencing individuals' choices to cooperate. This is not surprising given that an abundant literature on time discounting has shown that most individuals do indeed prefer immediate gains to delayed gains and prefer delayed losses to immediate losses (for a review, see Chapman, 1998) . What is surprising is that the temporal component of resource dilemmas has been generally ignored in experiments for so long. Research on time discounting may be able to greatly inform understanding of decision making in resource dilemmas.
The discount utility model is the most prominent theory concerning decision making over time (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2003) . The model states that the value of an outcome occurring later in time is a function of the present value of the outcome weighted by a constant time discounting rate. Most individuals show positive time discounting. For example, one might prefer to receive a smaller reward ($100) today rather than a larger reward ($120) a year from now. Although the discount utility model is still widely used, especially by economists, most of the assumptions underlying this model (e.g., fixed discount rate, exponential discounting) have not been supported by empirical research (Chapman, 1998; Frederick et al., 2003) . Several factors that have been shown to affect discount rates include the framing of outcomes as losses versus gains, the magnitude and delay of outcomes, the domain (e.g., health, money), and the uncertainty of the outcomes and the future (Berndsen & van der Pligt, 2001; Chapman, 1998; Frederick et al., 2003; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995) . Other theories about decision making over time have examined psychological factors such as self-control (Rachlin, 1989) , arousing versus abstract representations (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989) , and high-versus low-level cognitive construals (Trope & Liberman, 2003) .
Because of the temporal component within resource dilemmas, many of the factors that affect temporal preferences and discounting also should affect cooperation in resource dilemmas. In this study, we explored the uncertainty of outcomes. Adding uncertainty to both immediate and delayed outcomes has been shown to eliminate preferences for immediate gains versus delayed gains; in other words, increasing uncertainty of all outcomes decreases discounting (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Weber & Chapman, 2004) . Several mechanisms could be driving this result, including the possibility that uncertainty about the future is a primary psychological force behind time discounting. Rachlin and colleagues (Rachlin, 1989; Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986 ) also have argued that delay and uncertainty (probability) are psychologically equivalent in decision making. However, Weber and Chapman (2004) reasoned that time discounting also could be caused partly by uncertainty and partly by the psychological desire for immediate outcomes. In any case, these researchers as well as others have recognized the relationship between time preferences and certainty preferences and the difficultly in separating the two (see also Frederick et al., 2003; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991) .
The impact of uncertainty on individuals' willingness to cooperate has been investigated rather extensively in the study of resource dilemmas. However, there are many different kinds of uncertainty present in these dilemmas (Biel & Garling, 1995) . There is the social uncertainty of not knowing what the others in the group will do and the environmental uncertainty of not knowing information about the resource (e.g., size, growth rate, effects of depletion). Greater uncertainty about the size of a resource pool leads to more overconsumption (Budescu et al., 1995; Gustafsson, Biel, & Garling, 1999; Roch & Samuelson, 1997) . To our knowledge, no research on resource dilemmas has manipulated the uncertainty of the outcomes, as has been done in studies of time discounting (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Nicolaij & Hendrickx, 2003; Weber & Chapman, 2004) . In this study, we manipulated uncertainty about whether the resource depletion would actually occur. Uncertainty about environmental damage has lately played a large role in decision making at the policy level, in particular for the issues of mercury pollution and global warming. For example, the Bush administration has made it clear that their inaction in regard to global warming is in large part due to scientific uncertainty about its causes and effects. Nicolaij and Hendrickx (2003) found that perceived uncertainty about the consequences of global warming predicted less willingness to change environmentally harmful behaviors.
We hypothesized that higher scientific uncertainty about whether resource depletion would occur would lead to decreased willingness to cooperate by limiting resource use. Also based on the research by Keren and Roelofsma (1995) and Weber and Chapman (2004) , we hypothesized that higher uncertainty of resource depletion would decrease discounting. To study time discounting within the context of a resource dilemma, we explicitly modified the time structure by making the delayed negative effects of defecting and the delayed positive effects of cooperating occur either more immediately or farther into the future. To do this, we used hypothetical resource dilemmas and incorporated methodology more closely related to time discounting research in which participants are asked about decisions and impacts for generations into the future (see Chapman, 2001 , for similar methodology). This is different from the methods used by Messick and McClelland (1983) , who explored the impacts of the temporal dilemma by removing the social dilemma entirely, and from Mannix (1990) , who manipulated discount rates. But similar to Mannix, using this methodology we will be able to determine the effect that diminishing or enhancing the temporal dilemma has on cooperation rates. We hypothesized that participants would be more willing to cooperate if the effects of resource depletion would occur sooner rather than later because the temporal dilemma is diminished.
Individual Differences
The main individual difference variables that have been explored in relation to cooperation in resource dilemmas are social value orientation (i.e., prosocial vs. proself) and gender (Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002) . Surprisingly, only a few studies have looked at the relationship between environmental attitudes and cooperation in resource dilemmas (e.g., Garvill, 1999) . Because resource dilemmas are often, although not always, environmental in nature, it would seem likely that environmental attitudes would predict greater cooperation in resource dilemmas, just as they have been shown to predict other proenvironmental behaviors and decision making (e.g., Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000; Ebenbach, 1999; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2001 ). We also speculate that more positive environmental attitudes might predict less environmental time discounting as well, although this has not been explored empirically before. One characteristic that might set environmentalists apart from others is a concern for future outcomes of actions and policies, leading to a willingness to make sacrifices today for the future.
The extent to which a person cares about future outcomes in general is another individual characteristic that could predict cooperation rates in resource dilemmas given the temporal conflict embedded within these dilemmas. One measure of this characteristic is the Consideration of Future Consequences Scale (CFC) (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994) . Surprisingly, there is little research linking responses on this measure to time discounting. Chapman (1998) reported that CFC was only marginally associated with health discount rates and not at all associated with money discount rates. However, the original creators of the CFC scale showed that individuals high in CFC were more likely to favor an energy policy if it had future advantages (and immediate disadvantages) rather than immediate advantages (and future disadvantages), suggesting negative discounting (Strathman et al., 1994) . They also showed that CFC was correlated with self-reported environmental behaviors. CFC scores also positively predicted self-reported preferences for public transportation (which can be conceived as cooperation in a resource dilemma), although this relationship was partially mediated by the perceived environmental impact of automobiles (Joireman, Van Lange, & Van Vugt, 2004) . Perhaps individuals concerned for the future perceive a diminished temporal dilemma and thus cooperate more in resource dilemmas. Given this research, we predicted that participants high in CFC would show less time discounting and more cooperation in resource dilemmas.
The Present Study
In the present study, we collected data on two types of resource dilemmas. In the first task, participants responded to three hypothetical resource dilemmas about real-world environmental problems. Although simulation studies are the dominant method for studying resource dilemmas, it is difficult to include the scope of the time delay that is so common in real-world dilemmas. Often, the effects of real resource overuse are not felt for decades or even centuries. The temporal dilemma could be even more important when benefits or losses are delayed for generations. Within the hypothetical dilemmas, we manipulated the time it would take for the effects of resource depletion to occur and the uncertainty of whether it would actually occur. The second task consisted of a real resource dilemma in which participants could give up extra credit points to generate money to be donated to a local environmental group (a public goods dilemma). Time was manipulated by describing the mission of the environmental group as either focused on improving the environment for current city residents or the next generation of residents. A framing manipulation was added to this experiment to explore whether the effects of timing depend on how the request for cooperation is framed (as a loss vs. a gain). Framing has been shown to impact time discounting, such that people generally show less positive discounting for losses than for gains (see Chapman, 1998) . Therefore, we predicted that participants would be less affected by the timing manipulation in the loss condition compared to the gain condition.
METHODS

Participants
Participants (N = 112; male = 32, female = 80) were recruited from the introductory psychology subject pool at a large, midwestern university. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 30 years (M = 19.28, SD = 1.84). Participants were mostly White (84%), 10% were Asian, 4% Latino or Hispanic, and 2% Black. They received extra credit toward their grades in introductory psychology for participating but were offered an option to exchange some extra credit points for a donation to be made to an environmental organization.
Procedures
Participants worked independently in small groups ranging in size from one to six people. An experimenter first obtained written consent from each participant and then handed out a packet of materials that included all instructions and data collection measures. Participants worked individually on the experiment for approximately 40 minutes and upon completion were given a written debriefing form describing the purposes of the study.
Materials and Design
The stimuli consisted of three hypothetical resource dilemma tasks, several individual difference measures, and one measure of behavior in a real resource dilemma. Materials were always presented in the order in which they were just listed.
1 The order of the three hypothetical resource dilemmas was counterbalanced across participants.
The hypothetical resource dilemmas were stories based on contemporary real-world issues: overfishing of yellow perch in Lake Michigan, acquisition of water rights from farmers in Washington, and water conservation in urban Arizona (see the appendix). The participants were asked to imagine the situations as if they were really happening to them. After reading each story, participants were asked how much they would be willing to cooperate in the dilemma (i.e., limit their catch of yellow perch, forfeit some of their water rights, or reduce household water use) in 12 different conditions constructed from the within-subjects manipulation of a 6 (timing) × 2 (uncertainty) factorial design. Factor 1 was timing of the negative consequences of not cooperating, which either happened in a couple of years, in a decade, or for your children's, grandchildren's, greatgrandchildren's, or great-great-grandchildren's generation. For Factor 2, in the low uncertainty condition, participants first read that research conducted by a government agency (e.g., Department of Natural Resources) showed that "there is a high probability" that the negative effects of resource depletion would occur. For the moderate uncertainty condition, they read that there was a "moderate probability." The different timing and uncertainty conditions always were presented in the order just listed. A third factor (impact) was manipulated between subjects and included information about the effects of resource depletion, which were either described as affecting humans or wildlife.
2 Participants reported the percentage that they would be willing to limit or forfeit in each of the 12 conditions. They also answered open-ended questions about why they should or should not cooperate and what factors were important to them when making their decisions.
The real resource dilemma of sacrificing extra credit points was presented to the participants at the end of the study. They were told that there are 100 participants in the study and a pool of 200 extra credit points. They were given the option to receive two points of extra credit (the normal rate) or to exchange some of their points for a donation that would be made to a local environmental organization (1 point = $5). The participants were informed that the exchange system would be set up so that the more points remaining at the end of the study, the more the donated money would increase. If 100 or more points were left the money would double, if 75 to 99 points remained it increased by 75%, if 50 to 74 points were left it increased 50%, if 25 to 49 points were left it increased 25%, and if 0 to 24 points remained it did not increase. In this way, a situation was set up such that individual contributions (at most $10) were very little but if the whole group agreed to exchange a lot would be contributed (at most $2,000). Also, a lot of money could be donated even if one individual decided not to contribute (at most $1,732). This dilemma was modeled after a "give-some" public goods resource dilemma (Dawes, 1980) . In addition, two factors were manipulated in a 2 (timing) × 2 (framing) between-subjects factorial design. The timing manipulation consisted of a description of the environmental organization's mission that was either focused on improving the lake and watershed for current or for the next generation of city residents (see the appendix). The framing manipulation asked participants either how many extra credit points they wanted to give up or how many they wanted to receive. Three donors were solicited in advance to support this aspect of the project.
Participants also answered four questionnaires. Two were environmental attitude measures: the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) (Dunlap et al., 2000; Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978) and the Environmental Attitudes Scale (EAS) (Ebenbach, 1999; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2001 ). The NEP is a well-established, commonly used measure of environmental attitudes. In this study, we used the revised version, which Dunlap and colleagues reported has good internal reliability (Cronbach's α = .85) and validity. In our sample, Cronbach's α was .83 and participants generally reported proenvironmental attitudes (M = 6.02, SD = 1.04, range = 3.27 to 8.33, on a 1 to 9 scale). The EAS distinguishes between internally and externally motivated environmental attitudes, and the internal dimension is a better measure of environmental attitudes and a better predictor of proenvironmental behaviors than environmental scales that do not take attitude motivations into account (Ebenbach, 1999) . The internal scale has good internal reliability (Cronbach's αs = .90), test-retest reliability throughout a 12-week time period, r(72) = .77, p < .001, and validity (Ebenbach, 1999) . In our sample, Cronbach's α was .87 (M = 6.76, SD = 1.23, range = 3.11 to 9.00, on a 1 to 9 scale).
The third questionnaire assessed participants' awareness of environmental consequences for self, society, and the biosphere using three, three-item scales and included a fourth, four-item scale measuring intentions to take proenvironmental political action. These items were taken from Stern, Dietz, and Kalof (1993) . The authors reported that reliability of the scales is moderate but gave no numerical or other information about reliability or validity. Only the society (M = 7.26, SD = 1.17), biosphere (M = 6.55, SD = 1.38), and political action (M = 6.21, SD = 1.50) scales were used in this study (Cronbach's αs = .57, .59, and .78, respectively). All three were measured on 1 to 9 scales.
The fourth questionnaire was the Consideration of Future Consequences Scale (CFC) (Strathman et al., 1994) . The CFC measures how much one considers the delayed effects of present actions and how important these effects are to decision making. Strathman et al. reported that this scale has good internal reliability (Cronbach's αs > .80), test-retest reliability, r(100) = .72, p < .001, and validity. In our sample, Cronbach's α was .85, and participants tended to be future oriented (M = 5.88, SD = 1.02, range = 3.50 to 8.17, on a 1 to 9 scale).
RESULTS
Hypothetical Resource Dilemmas
Preliminary analyses of the differences between dilemma topics revealed that they were all qualitatively similar; therefore, we averaged individuals' responses across topics. First, we tested the hypotheses concerning the effects of uncertainty and length of delay of resource depletion on participants' ratings of the percentage they were willing to give up. We conducted a 2 (uncertainty) × 6 (time) × 2 (impact) × 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA with uncertainty and time as within-subjects and impact and gender as between-subjects variables. There were significant main effects of uncertainty, F(1, 108) = 148.68, p < .001, MSE = 150.99, partial ω 2 = .40; time, F(5, 540) = 23.02, p < .001, MSE = 208.23, partial ω 2 = .14; and gender, F(1, 108) = 9.78, p = .002, MSE = 4268.21, partial ω 2 = .07. On average, participants reported greater willingness to limit resource consumption if uncertainty was low, if the impacts of overconsumption occurred sooner rather than later, and if they were women. There were no significant effects of impact description.
There was a significant interaction between uncertainty and gender, F(1, 108) = 4.91, p = .03, MSE = 150.99, partial ω 2 = .02. The effect of uncertainty was greater for women than for men. There was also a significant interaction between uncertainty and time, F(5, 540) = 3.48, p = .03, MSE = 12.09, partial ω 2 = .01, that was predominately linear in form as shown by a significant linear Time × Uncertainty interaction, F(1, 108) = 5.30, p = .02, MSE = 72.72. This linear trend accounted for 91.7% of the total sum of squares for the interaction, and the residual sum of squares was not significant, F(1, 540) = 1.45, p > .05. As shown in Figure 1 , in the low uncertainty condition, willingness to limit resource consumption decreased at a slightly faster rate over time (slope = -0.101) compared to the moderate uncertainty condition (slope = -0.088).
Individual differences. To test the hypotheses regarding the relationship between individual differences and cooperation in resource dilemmas, we first used principal components analysis (PCA) to reduce the number of environmentalism variables. In the PCA, we included five scale scores: two environmental attitude scales (EAS and NEP), two scales on the awareness of environmental consequences for society and the biosphere, and one scale on willingness to take proenvironmental political action. The first factor accounted for 68% of the variance and was the only factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (eigenvalue = 3.41). All variables had factor loadings between .78 and .88 on this factor. A factor score was created by weighting all five scale scores by their factor loadings; higher values indicate more proenvironmentalism. This environmentalism factor correlated significantly with CFC, r(110) = .35, p < .001. CFC did not load highly on the environmentalism factor and so was treated as a separate predictor.
Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) was used to test for individual difference effects on the intercept and slope for willingness to cooperate across time. HLM version 5.05 (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2001 ) was used to run analyses. Models were initially fit for low and moderate uncertainty data separately, but the model estimates were so similar that they were combined to simplify the results. Time was coded as 0 for the 1-to 2-year delay, 8 for the decade delay, 28 for children's generation, 58 for grandchildren's, 88 for great-grandchildren's, and 118 for great-great-grandchildren's.
Initially, a baseline model was fit in which only gender (0 = male, 1 = female) of the participant was included as a predictor of the intercept and slope. Then, environmentalism, CFC, and their interaction were entered as continuous predictors. Adding the individual difference factors into the model significantly improved model fit, model difference χ 2 (6) = 27.82, p < .01. Results showed that the interaction of environmentalism and CFC was a significant predictor of the intercept, that is, the willingness to cooperate in the 1-to 2-year delay condition (see righthand column of Table 1 ). The interaction did not significantly predict the slope, which was surprising be- appeared to be a strong interaction effect (see Figure 2) , in which those high in both environmentalism and CFC showed no time discounting but all other groups showed positive time discounting. Examining the data further verified that the effect of these individual difference variables on the slope was not continuous. As scores became more extremely positive on both environmentalism and CFC, slopes did not continue to increase, and extremely negative scores did not yield increasingly negative slopes. We hypothesized that there may be a threshold effect, such that exhibiting above-average environmentalism and CFC predicts reduced time discounting, regardless of how high one is on these measures. For this reason, analyzing the data using groups seemed to represent the results more accurately.
We initially examined four groups using median splits (see Table 2 ), but because it is well recognized that using median splits to create groups can produce statistical artifacts (Maxwell & Delaney, 1993) , we also used cluster analysis to verify the results. We clustered participants based on their environmentalism and CFC scores using K-means cluster analysis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984) . K-means is a process by which individuals are assigned to clusters based on the similarity between their scores and the cluster centers. The process maximizes the distance between cluster centers and iteratively updates clusters until change in cluster centers falls below a criterion. We requested four clusters. The groups produced by cluster analysis corresponded conceptually to the groups created by median splits (see Table 2 ); however, the groups were different enough to reject Bowker's test of symmetry that all p ij = p ji , χ 2 (6) = 15.70, p = .02.
Three dummy variables were added to the HLM model to represent the four different environment-CFC groups. High environmentalism and high CFC was used as the reference group. We interpret results from the median split model, although Table 1 shows that the clustering model produced almost identical results. The intercept is the amount that participants in the high environmentalism and high CFC group were willing to limit for the 1-to 2-year delay (38.00%), controlling for gender. This amount was significantly higher than for participants with low environmentalism and high CFC (24.02%, p = .02) and marginally significantly higher than for participants low in both environmentalism and CFC (29.93%, p = .07). Participants high in environmentalism but low in CFC did not differ from the reference group on the initial amount they were willing to limit (35.68%, p = .64).
Participants high in both environmentalism and CFC showed no pattern of discounting across the different delay conditions (slope = -0.03, p = .43). However, participants in all other groups showed significantly greater decreases in willingness to cooperate across time. Slopes were significantly more negative for participants high in environmentalism but low in CFC (slope = -0.16, p = .01), low in environmentalism but high in CFC (slope = -0.13, p = .04), and low on both measures (slope = -0.17, p = .004). 
Real Resource Dilemma
On average, participants gave up about half an extra credit point (out of two possible). 3 We conducted a 2 (timing: present vs. future) × 2 (framing: give up vs. receive) × 2 (gender) ANCOVA with environmentalism, CFC, and their interaction entered as continuous covariates. The model accounted for 30% of the variance in points given up. There was a significant main effect of time, F(1,98) = 3.99, p < .05, MSE = 0.25, partial ω 2 = .03, such that in the present time condition participants gave up more points (M = 0.61) than in the future time condition (M = 0.39), controlling for covariates. The gender main effect was only marginally significant once covariates were entered in the model, F(1 ,98) = 3.07, p = .08, MSE = 0.25, partial ω 2 = .02, M women = 0.59, M men = 0.41. This could have occurred because in our sample, women were higher than men on ratings of environmentalism and CFC, although not significantly so.
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
Of the individual difference factors, environmentalism significantly predicted points given up, F(1, 98) = 5.64, p = .02, MSE = 0.25, but CFC and the interaction did not, Fs = 1.65 and 1.51, ps = .20 and .22, respectively. Using the groups created earlier as dummy variables in the models again produced slightly different results. The effect of environmentalism seemed to be driven by the high environmentalism and high CFC group (M median splits = 0.77, SD = 0.57; M cluster groups = 0.76, SD = 0.58) because it was the only group to give up significantly more points than any other group. They gave up significantly more points than those high in CFC but low in environmentalism (M median splits = 0.40, SD = 0.49, p = .01; M cluster groups = 0.00, SD = 0.00, p = .01) and those low on both measures (M median splits = 0.41, SD = 0.54, p = .02; M cluster groups = 0.44, SD = 0.51, p = .01). Participants high in environmentalism but low in CFC (M median splits = 0.45, SD = 0.57; M cluster groups = 0.50, SD = 0.56) did not give up significantly more points than either of the two low environmentalism groups (ps > .09).
DISCUSSION
There were four main findings of the present study that we will discuss: the main effects of time and uncertainty, the interaction between time and uncertainty, and the influence of individual differences on time discounting and cooperation in resource dilemmas.
First, our results demonstrated that the temporal dilemma that is normally embedded within resource dilemmas has an important influence on decisions to cooperate. In the hypothetical resource dilemmas, participants were more willing to cooperate (reduce resource consumption) if the temporal dilemma was diminished, that is, if the negative effects of defecting (overconsuming) were to occur sooner. In the real resource dilemma, participants also cooperated more (gave up more points) when the temporal dilemma was diminished such that the positive benefits of cooperating were to occur sooner. An implication of this finding is that delayed effects are less likely to be incorporated into current decision making because most people apply positive time discounting to both negative and positive effects of decisions when the effects are delayed. For participants who discounted the most (n = 20) and the least (n = 20), we coded the reasons they gave for their responses to the hypothetical dilemmas. Of participants who discounted the most heavily, 80% explained that time was an important factor in making their decision. If resource depletion would immediately affect them, they would be more willing to conserve the resource now. Only 15% of these respondents wrote that concern for future generations was an important factor for them. In contrast, of those participants showing no or negative discounting, 70% reported that concern for future generations was an important factor in their decision making. For example, one participant wanted her "children to have the same thing as [her] growing up," and another wrote that "everyone is equal."
These responses highlight the fact that manipulating the temporal component of resource dilemmas may change the nature of the social component. A social dilemma requires that an individual benefits more if he or she defects, but the group as a whole is worse off if everyone defects than if everyone cooperates. If resource depletion will not occur until the individual is dead, then the group that benefits from cooperation is not made up of the individuals who actually cooperated. It does not appear that most participants in this study made a distinction between whether they would be alive or dead when the effects occurred because there was no inflection point in cooperation rates between 60 and 90 or 90 and 120 years. However, because we manipulated time in terms of generations, it may have caused participants to think that resource depletion would harm only other generations and not their own, even if they were still alive.
Another consequence of extending the temporal dilemma so far into the future, when participants would likely be dead, is that it may have prompted individuals to think about their own mortality. According to terror management theory, when people are reminded of their mortality they try to reduce their terror and anxiety by adhering to cultural worldviews that offer them symbolic immortality (e.g., Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989) . As a result, mortality salience could affect responses to environmental resource dilemmas. For example, researchers have theorized that awareness of mortality may contribute to overconsumption (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004) , and Kasser and Sheldon (2000) found that inducing mortality salience led participants to harvest more timber in a forest management resource dilemma game. However, cooperation in resource dilemmas is generally considered a prosocial behavior, and in another study, reminders of mortality induced culturally prescribed prosocial behaviors and attitudes (Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002) . Whether cooperation in resource dilemmas is considered culturally prescribed may depend on specific aspects of the dilemmas. It would be interesting to investigate factors that might encourage or discourage cooperation in resource dilemmas in the face of mortality awareness.
The second main finding of our study is that uncertainty influences cooperation rates. We manipulated the uncertainty that resource depletion would actually oc-cur, which had not been done before, and found that participants reported greater willingness to cooperate when uncertainty was low compared to moderate. Uncertainty was a within-subjects variable, which could lead to speculation that participants were not convinced by the manipulation. However, coding the reasons given by the highest and lowest discounters revealed that more than 60% of those participants listed the certainty or probability that the serious environmental effects would occur as one of the important reasons for their decisions. The communication of uncertainty in environmental science by government and media is very common, and it is also not uncommon to see conflicting reports about how certain the science actually is (Friedman, Dunwoody, & Rogers, 1999) .
The third main finding is that, as predicted, uncertainty also interacted with time, revealing that participants discounted slightly less under conditions of higher uncertainty. This finding is similar to that shown by Keren and Roelofsma (1995) and Weber and Chapman (2004) , as discussed in the introduction. This effect highlights the fact that delay and uncertainty, although manipulated factorially, are inherently connected psychologically. Indeed, one reason people may show positive time discounting is because the future is uncertain (Frederick et al., 2003; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Weber & Chapman, 2004) . Of the participants who discounted the most, 55% justified it by claiming an uncertain future, for example, one wrote, "Maybe in the future, something could have been invented or found to prevent water shortage."
The fourth main result of our study is that certain individual difference variables seem to interact to predict time discounting. The striking result was that those high in both environmentalism and CFC showed virtually no time discounting but all others showed fairly strong positive discounting in the hypothetical dilemmas. Other studies on environmental time discounting also have found groups of individuals who did not positively discount (e.g., Nicolaij & Hendrickx, 2003; Svenson & Karlsson, 1989 ; see also Hendrickx & Nicolaij, 2004) , but only in our study were individual difference variables included that could partly explain this result. Our findings also coincide well with that of Joireman at al. (2004) , who found that perceived environmental impact of cars predicted preferences for cooperation in a commuting resource dilemma only for individuals high in CFC. Why the combination of high CFC and environmentalism defined a unique group of individuals who were not affected by the delay of negative impacts of resource depletion, even when that delay was several generations into the future, is an interesting question. CFC is an expression of the relative importance of beliefs about future outcomes, and environmentalism reflects whether future environmental outcomes would be evaluated positively or negatively. According to Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) expectancy-value theory, together, these beliefs and evaluations could predict attitudes toward cooperating in a resource dilemma with future outcomes. Attitudes toward cooperation should then be related to intentions to cooperate. Using this approach also could explain why Chapman (1998) found that CFC was only marginally correlated with health discount rates. If she had combined scores on the CFC with assessments of health concerns, together these measures might have been much more predictive of time discounting in the health domain.
The confluence of high CFC with extreme attitudes also might help explain forms of seemingly radical behavior. For example, our results shed some light on one reason why many people may find it difficult to understand the most committed environmentalists. Positive time discounting is regarded as economically rational thinking, but the most committed environmentalists may not discount the future when they think about the environment. They may value extremely long-range impacts of decisions as much as or even more than the short-term impacts. This could lead them to have drastically different ideas about the importance of current environmental problems and potential solutions-ideas that more present-oriented thinkers may view as irrational.
Finally, in the real resource dilemma of the present study, environmentalism had a main effect on cooperation, such that those higher in environmentalism gave up more points. Group analyses, however, indicate that it was again the high environmentalism and high CFC group that brought about this result. Participants in this group cooperated significantly more than those in the low environmentalism, low CFC group and those in the low environmentalism, high CFC group, whereas, participants in the high environmentalism, low CFC group did not differ in their cooperation from any other group.
Limitations
One limitation of this study is that the first task used hypothetical resource dilemmas. Although these dilemmas were based on real-world issues of pressing importance, the participants, as all college students, most likely had little firsthand experience with the particular dilemmas. It is difficult to say how similar their actual patterns of cooperation would be if they were faced with these dilemmas in real life. In addition, participants responded to multiple Time × Uncertainty combinations manipulated within subjects and in the same order. This type of design may have encouraged theoretical thinking and may have produced large main effects because participants could directly compare conditions. We agree that these responses probably differ from actual behaviors but we also think that these types of hypothetical scenarios in which multiple conditions are considered simultaneously are important because they are very common in environmental policy making. Because science is uncertain and environment impacts are often delayed, policy makers are forced to compare a number of possible outcomes and make decisions as if these outcomes would become realities.
The real resource dilemma was personally relevant to the participants because it involved giving up extra credit points toward their introductory psychology grades. It produced results similar to the hypothetical dilemmas. A limitation of the real resource dilemma, however, is that participants always responded at the very end of the study about how many extra credit points they would be willing to give up. Perhaps participants who reported high levels of environmentalism also agreed to give up the most extra credit points in the final dilemma because they wanted their actions to be in accord with their previously reported beliefs. In addition, the participants in this study scored toward the higher end on the environmentalism and CFC scales. We might have found even more dramatic results for these individual difference measures if our sample contained more participants who were extremely low on these measures.
Finally, an important question is whether the effects of environmentalism and CFC shown in this study would extend to other resource dilemma studies that are either not about environmental issues or do not contain such long-term delays. For example, in many laboratory dilemma games, participants use points or money to simulate a resource, in which case we would expect other value orientations besides environmentalism to hold sway.
Implications and Research Directions
Our study showed that time, uncertainty of resource depletion, and individual differences all affect cooperation in resource dilemmas. This research suggests two approaches to encouraging cooperation. First, when the effects of cooperation and defection are felt more immediately, both the temporal dilemma and uncertainty are reduced, and cooperation will be enhanced. Although many environmental problems have very long range consequences, there are often early impacts and warning signs that could be emphasized. Environmental monitoring and publicity of research results on early impacts are central to preventing long-term ecological disasters. This is the idea behind biological monitoring of "indicator species" for changes that will provide early warning of environmental damage (de la Torre, Snowdon, & Bejarano, 2000) . However, making resource depletion seem more immediate would probably only lead to more cooperation if individuals truly believed that by cooperating they could have a positive effect on the resource (Smithson, 1999) . This is in line with research on criticality and public goods dilemmas, which has shown that individuals cooperate more if they feel their cooperation is critical to providing the good (e.g., De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002) .
A second approach is to induce decision makers to give more consideration to the future consequences of their actions. One option is to frame the negative impacts as harmful for our children and grandchildren. This study used such generational language, as opposed to saying 30 or 60 years, but it would be interesting to see if results would differ if years were used instead. Another mechanism for inducing consideration of future consequences might be to encourage individuals to think about their emotional reactions to future resource depletion or to defecting. Research on affective forecasting has shown that individuals tend to overestimate their future emotional reactions (e.g., Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998) . If they overestimate the guilt, regret, or outrage they would feel about future resource depletion, they may be more likely to factor that future outcome into their present decision making, much like research has shown that anticipating counterfactual regret for negative future outcomes can influence present behaviors and intentions (e.g., Hetts, Boninger, Armor, Gleicher, & Nathanson, 2000) . Finally, those participants who habitually think about future consequences and regard environmental issues as very important were the ones who cooperated the most in the resource dilemmas and even when faced with strong temporal dilemmas showed virtually no discounting of the future. We think more research investigating the differences between people who tend to think long term and those who do not and when people might be more likely to use long-term thinking could bring new insights to encouraging proenvironmental choices.
APPENDIX Resource Dilemma Examples
Impact was manipulated between subjects in all dilemmas. Impacts to wildlife are shown in the first dilemma and impacts to humans in the second.
WATER SHORTAGES IN ARIZONA
You live in Tucson, Arizona, where water conservation has always been an issue due to the desert climate. Recent population growth has made demands on the water supply even higher. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that there will be several decades of below-average precipitation in Arizona and that current rates of water consumption could lead to serious water shortages. Extensive periods of drought and overuse of water put area rivers at risk of running dry. In the past, the Santa Cruz River in downtown Tucson went dry and is now a wasteland through the city. The city council is worried about the San Pedro River, which is one of the only free-flowing waterways left in Arizona. The San Pedro River supports an ecosystem of green grasses and cottonwood trees, which is an oasis for many migratory birds and other animals within the otherwise barren desert. The council is calling on individual Tucson residents like you to conserve water at home so that more water can be diverted to the San Pedro to protect this sensitive ecosystem. There are several things you can do to reduce your water use, including using only desert plants in your landscaping, watering your plants early in the morning or late at night to reduce evaporation, not washing your car, and buying a low-flush toilet and low-flow shower head.
YELLOW PERCH IN LAKE MICHIGAN
You make your living by commercial fishing yellow perch on Lake Michigan. Lately, it has been harder and harder to make ends meet in the fishing industry because of falling prices and declining fish populations, although you currently are making a decent living. The state Department of Natural Resources (DNR) reports that the current rate of fishing yellow perch is not sustainable. If changes are not made to limit individual's catches, the perch population will no longer be able to support commercial fishing and the DNR will be forced to prohibit all fishing of yellow perch.
REAL RESOURCE DILEMMA
Present Condition
Friends of Lake Wingra work to improve the current condition of the lake and watershed for all Madison residents to enjoy. They have projects in-progress that are protecting and restoring the aquatic wetland, savanna, and woodland communities of Lake Wingra. They are effectively managing storm water runoff and its associated pollutants to keep Lake Wingra habitable for our native wildlife and safe for fishing, swimming, and other recreation. They are educating those who currently live, work, and play in the Lake Wingra Watershed so all will understand the lake's ecology and become aware of how their actions affect the lake.
Future Condition
Friends of Lake Wingra work to improve the lake and watershed for the next generation of Madison residents to enjoy. They have long-term projects planned to protect and restore the future aquatic wetland, savanna, and woodland communities of Lake Wingra. They are designing strategies for effective management of storm water runoff and its associated pollutants to make Lake Wingra habitable for our native wildlife and safe for fishing, swimming, and other recreation far into the future. They have plans to educate future Madisonians who will live, work, and play in the Lake Wingra Watershed so all will understand the lake's ecology and become aware of how their actions affect the lake. NOTES 1. Because the manipulation of independent variables in the hypothetical dilemmas occurred prior to participants completing subsequent tasks, there could be concern that the manipulation affected responses on the individual difference measures or the real dilemma. All manipulations were within subjects except for the independent variable of impact. An ANOVA showed that impact did not have a significant effect on any subsequent measurement (ps > .20).
2. By manipulating impact, we were attempting to pull out a distinction between anthropocentrism and biocentrism as two ways of valuing nature. Because most people value nature anthropocentrically, we expected that when effects on humans were emphasized, people would be more likely to cooperate. Impact had no significant main effects or interactions in the models, and so, given length limitations, it is not discussed further.
3. There was concern that participants later in the academic semester would be less likely to give up extra credit points; however, there was no significant main effect of or interactions with time of semester when this variable was included in the model.
